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GAMES LAWYERS PLAY WITH THE
BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCE CHALLENGE
TO ACCOUNTS AND INVENTORY FINANCING
William E. Hogan-
I
INTRODUCTION
Much ink has been put to paper concerning the effect of the pref-
erence provisions of the BankruptcyAct upon the Uniform Commer-
cial Code's provisions for financing accounts receivable and inventory.
In the face of so much erudition, one hesitates to add to the bibliog-
raphy. Yet, sometimes the technical focus of the discussion tempts one
to raise other kinds of issues. Resistance to that temptation became
impossible for this writer with the decision in In re Portland News-
paper Publishing Co.' Judge Solomon's opinion injects a welcome note
of pragmatism into a dispute previously characterized by the intricate
analyses good lawyers do so well. Of course, any competent craftsman
enjoys a sense of satisfaction from a closely reasoned analysis of the
interrelations of two complex statutes. It is fun and often like a game.
Yet, as Judge Solomon indicates, legal gamesmanship does not by itself
produce the standards needed in the marketplace.
The facts generating the discussion are easy to state, but the re-
sulting legal problem is difficult to resolve. In 1959 various striking
newspaper unions in Portland, Oregon, organized a company to publish
The Reporter, a daily newspaper, to compete with the two existing
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1949, LL.B. 1952, Boston College; SJ.D.
1963, Harvard University.
1 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967), noted in 42 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 150 (1967), 44 TEXAS L.
REv. 1369 (1966), and 8 B.C. IND. & Con. L. REv. 101 (1966). Two other recent decisions
support the result in the case. In re White,---F. Supp.-(S.D. Ohio 1967); Rosenberg
v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967).
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newspapers. Another company, Rose City, was formed to acquire build-
ings to house The Reporter. Rose City loaned $45,000 to The Reporter
on November 16, 1963, and another $10,300 on November 22. On the
latter date, the parties entered into a security agreement that gave Rose
City a security interest in all The Reporter's accounts "now existing or
hereafter arising." An appropriate financing statement was duly filed
on November 26, 1963. Financial difficulties led friends of The Re-
porter to take various additional actions, including a merger, to infuse
life into the newspaper. The efforts failed, and on September 23, 1964,
Rose City took steps to collect the accounts. On October 15, 1964, an
involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed by other creditors, and
shortly thereafter the successor corporation publishing The Reporter
was adjudicated a bankrupt.
Law then took over, and the theme soon became "woe unto the
lender." The trustee asserted that Rose City's claim to all accounts
arising within four months prior to bankruptcy constituted a voidable
preference. The Referee in Bankruptcy agreed with the trustee in an
eloquent and literate opinion.2
Rose City had taken each and every action that the Uniform Com-
mercial Code requires of a creditor seeking to obtain a security interest
in accounts. The debtor had apparently signed a written agreement,3
providing Rose City with a security interest in collateral described as
all the accounts receivable both "now existing or hereafter arising."4
A financing statement in appropriate form had been filed properly.5
Moreover, these steps had been taken long before the petition in bank-
ruptcy was filed. It is true that Rose City had failed to take some steps
a professional lender might have taken, but Rose City simply was
not a professional. No routine was established for policing the accounts,
as by routing collections through a bank account in Rose City's name,
but UCC Section 9-205 clearly destroys the notion that the debtor's
control or dominion over the collateral makes the transfer fraudulent
as to his creditors.6 No supplementary schedules of assigned accounts
2 Civil No. B64-3282 (D. Ore., filed Feb. 9, 1966), 4 CCH INSTALMENT CREDIT GumE
98,483 (1966), 3 UCC REP. SERv. 194 (1966).
3 UNIFORM COMIMERCIAL CODE § 9-203 [hereinafter cited as UCG].
4 UCC § 9-110.
5 UCC §§ 9-401, 9-402.
6 As is so often the case, Grant Gilmore has best described the effect of § 9-205: "No
one can doubt that this does the job. Twyne's Case is finally undone. Benedict is dead
and Ratner is king. 'Dominion' by the debtor is no longer 'inconsistent' with the nature
of security." 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.6 at 358 (1965)
(footnote omitted).
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were to be prepared and sent to the creditor periodically, but the Code
also explicitly eliminates the need for such paper work.7
When all the other requisites for an enforceable security interest
are satisfied, that security interest attaches and is perfected as soon as
the debtor has rights in the collateral.8 The Code provides also that
the debtor acquires no rights in an account until it comes into exist-
enceP Apparently, life is breathed into an account when the debtor has
a "right to payment for goods sold or leased which is not evidenced by
an instrument."'10 Thus, whenever The Reporter earned a right to pay-
ment from its sales, Rose City's security interest was perfected in that
account.".
When a transaction is tested against the bankruptcy trustee's
power to avoid a preference, the usual starting point is to list the ele-
ments of the voidable preference. One can say, in a deceptively simple
fashion, that the trustee must show (1) a transfer of the debtor's prop-
erty, (2) to or for the benefit of a creditor, (3) for or on account of an
antecedent debt, (4) made or suffered by the debtor while insolvent,
(5) within four months before the filing of the petition initiating the
proceeding, (6) the effect of which transfer enables the creditor to ob-
tain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the
same class, and (7) that the creditor knew or had reasonable cause to
believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer.12
After the Referee found that Rose City had reasonable cause to
know of The Reporter's insolvency, the issues were reduced to two.
First, did the transfer of the accounts take place within the perilous
four month zone prior to bankruptcy? Second, was that transfer for
or on account of an antecedent debt? The trustee, of course, needed
7 UCC § 9-205. See also UCC § 9-204, Comment 4.
8 UCC §§ 9-204, 9-303. See also UCC § 9-204, Comment 4.
9 UCC § 9-204(2)(d).
10 The source of the obligation assigned to Rose City is not clear. If the obligation
arose from the sale of advertising space rather than the sale of papers, the classification of
the collateral seems obscure. Unless the sale of advertising space is the sale of a service, the
collateral might not be an "account." Rather, it would be either a contract right or a
general intangible. UCC § 9-106. Would this argument make the description of the
collateral in the security agreement inadequate?
11 If the collateral is a general intangible, see note 10 supra, the Code rules might
permit earlier attachment and perfection, since UCC § 9-204 does not specifically define
when "rights" arise with respect to general intangibles.
12 Bankruptcy Act §§ 60a(1), b, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(a)(1), (b) (1964); see Seligson, Prefer-
ences Under the Bankruptcy Act, 15 VAND. L. Rav. 115, 115-17 (1961). The four month
period is of obscure origin, but apparently it is a compromise between different periods
used in other similar statutes. Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 81
MINN. L. REv. 401, 421-27 (1947).
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an affirmative answer to both questions in order to establish that Rose
City had received a preference. Obviously the two questions are in-
terrelated; one must know when the transfer occurred in order to
decide whether it occurred within the four month period and whether
the consideration was an antecedent debt.
Since 1950, Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act has provided that
a transfer of personal property occurs, for purposes of the preference
rules, when it becomes "so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon
such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple
contract [can] become superior to the rights of the transferee."' 3 Now
the stage is set for a review of the intricate games lawyers play so skill-
fully, whether they speak for the secured creditor or the trustee, when
they first attempt to ascertain the time when the transfer of accounts
and inventory occurred and then whether that transfer was for an
antecedent debt.
II
ATOMS AND MOLECULES
This game provided the basic premise of the referee's rejection of
Rose City's secured position; 4 the trustee nearly always wins. Lean-
ing heavily on the Code rules detailing when a security interest
attaches and becomes perfected, the trustee asserts that the Code plainly
provides that no security interest can attach or be perfected until a
specific account comes into existence.' 5 Since the Code itself atomizes
the collateral, each separately arising account is considered to be sepa-
rately transferred at the specific time when the debtor obtains rights
in the collateral.' 6 The Code rules on the attachment and perfection of
13 Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2), 64 Stat. 24 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1964).
14 Civil No. B64-3282 (D. Ore., filed Feb. 9, 1966), 4 CCH INSTALMENT CREDIT GUIDE
98,483 (1966), 3 UCC REP. SERv. 194 (1966).
15 The strongest statement of the atomizers' approach is in Gordon, The Security
Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Preference
Problem, 62 CoLUm. L. REv. 49 (1962), reprinted in 1 P. COOGAN, W. HoGAN & D. VAGTS,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 11.01-.09 (1967) [herein-
after cited as CooGA, HOGAN & VAGTS].
16 Why the law cannot recognize present legal arrangements as encumbering later-
arising personal property is a mystery. All the issues concerning the relative rights of the
secured creditor and his various adversaries could have been resolved by the Code drafts-
men without reference to when the debtor obtained rights in the collateral. In fact, this
was done in the case of competition among secured lenders who have filed. UCC
§ 9-312(5)(a). Perhaps the study of law somehow conditions people to believe in the absolute
necessity of their acquired assumptions. If there can be no present legal transfer of future
goods under that old casebook chestnut, Low v. Pew, 108 Mass. 347 (1871), there must be
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the security interest are thus made responsible for the trustee's victory.' 7
Rose City might have battled the trustee at this very point. If the
Bankruptcy Act controls when the transfer occurs, we must look to the
timing test provided in section 60a. The transfer of personal property
is deemed made when it is so far perfected that no subsequent lien
creditor could have acquired rights superior to the transferee.'8 Rose
City can claim that after the filing of its financing statement no lien
creditor could acquire superior rights. Since the account is perfected
at the moment it comes into existence, any creditor thereafter levying
on it would take subject to the perfected security interest.' On the
other hand, if, prior to the existence of the accounts, a lien creditor is
permitted to exert his proces4 against the account debtor and is some-
how given a right to the account as soon as the account arises, he may
tie but not defeat the secured creditor. Consequently, to prevail
over Rose City, the trustee must show not only that a garnishing cred-
itor's process can reach after-arising accounts, but also that this process
gives the garnishing creditor priority over the secured creditor claiming
under his after-acquired property clause.20
As is so often the case, the "simple" federal statutory test of re-
ferring an issue to the state law governing the rights of a competing
lien creditor proves to be complex. Since enactment of the Code, no
state court has been called upon to decide whether a garnishing cred-
itor might receive such a priority. The trustee probably would try to
avoid the secured creditor's argument by relying not on section 60a
but on the Bankruptcy Act's general definition of "transfer." 2' Hence,
"rights in the collateral" under the Code. At least the requirement gives law teachers
something to write about. See Hogan, Future Goods, Floating Liens, and Foolish Creditors,
17 STAN. L. REv. 822 (1965).
17 King, Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Does It Insulate the Security
Interest from Attack by a Trustee in Bankruptcy? 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1117 (1966).
18 Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1964).
19 Kripke, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act, 42 N.Y.U.L. RFv. 284, 289 (1967).
20 Garnishment laws, like most enforcement laws, are extremely diverse. In some
states the garnishment process would not reach a debt arising subsequent to the service of
process upon the account debtor. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 62, § 39 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1967); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 246, §§ 20, 24 (1956); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 5201
(McKinney 1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.18 (Supp. 1967). Other jurisdictions permit the
garnishment process to reach indebtedness arising prior to the answer by the garnishee
or prior to a determination of liability. E.g., N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 512:20 (1955); Tax. R.
Civ. P. 666. Massachusetts has a statute that requires an attaching or garnishing creditor,
at the risk of losing his lien, to notify any secured party who has filed and to discharge the
secured claim on demand. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 223, § 75 (Supp. 1906), construed in
John Sexton Co. v. Olde Field Food Prods., Inc., 348 Mass. 785, 204 N.E.2d 440 (1965).
21 "Transfer" shall include the sale and every other and different mode, direct
or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an interest therein
or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or upon an
1968]
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the secured creditor received his transfer only when his interest was
fixed in the after-acquired property.
According to the atomists, section 9-108 is a transparent attempt
by states to control the result in federally-governed preference cases by
defining when a transfer occurs for an antecedent debt.22 The section
seems more modest when read:
Section 9-108. WHEN AFTER-AcQUIRED COLLATERAL NOT SECURITY
FOR ANTECEDENT DEBT
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation,
releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value
which is to be secured in whole or in part by after-acquired prop-
erty his security interest in the after-acquired collateral shall be
deemed to be taken for new value and not as security for an ante-
cedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral
either in the ordinary course of his business or under a contract of
purchase made pursuant to the security agreement within a reason-
able time after new value is given.
They contend that the rest of the Code and the Bankruptcy Act adhere
to the traditional notion that an account cannot be transferred or be-
come the collateral under a security agreement until the account comes
into existence. When bankruptcy occurs, many such accounts will
have arisen within four months, and, if the original consideration, a
loan, was given before those accounts arose, their transfer was a pref-
erence. Finally, since this result follows from federal law, section 9-108
cannot cause a different result.
There are several countermoves for the secured creditor. He can
attempt to play "Fat Pig," "Rivers and Streams," or "Tit for Tat."
III
FAT PIG
Still focusing on the timing of the transfer, the game opens by as-
suming a hypothetical case not involving inventory or accounts receiva-
ble financing. More than four months before bankruptcy a chattel mort-
gage is taken and perfected on a specific pig to secure an advance then
interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily, by or
without judicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, assignment, payment, pledge,
mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gift, security, or othervise; the retention of a
security title to property delivered to a debtor shall be deemed a transfer suffered
by such debtor ... ,.
Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1964).
22 Their reaction to the section has been aptly described as a "red rag to the § 60
bulls." 2, G. GILMoE, supra note 6, § 45.6, at 1509.
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made. Subsequently, the farmer-mortgagor feeds the pig in order to fat-
ten him for market.23 Inevitably, the pig grows both in weight and, if
the market is favorable, in value. Is the unmortgaged feed given to the
mortgaged pig during the four month period prior to bankruptcy a pre-
ferential transfer? If the transaction is atomized, one can argue that a
preference occurs with each gulp of the feeding pig. Simply stating that
conclusion seems so silly that the trustee's position is overwhelmed by
a kind of reductio ad absurdum. But feeding the pig might properly
be classified as an incidence of the classical preference if done in an
unusual way and in contemplation of bankruptcy. Without too much
imagination one can conceive of the debtor diverting especially valuable
feed to the pig in order to speed its growth and thereby enhance
the value of the collateral for the inadequately secured creditor. De-
spite the practical difficulties in segregating the amount of the increase
in the pig's value attributable to this diversion, the debtor has engaged
in the kind of conduct that classical preference law condemns. The
unusual diversion of the bankrupt's assets to a single creditor upsets
the balance sought by bankruptcy distribution.
IV
RwERs AND STREAMs
In a more sophisticated version of Fat Pig, the ontologically ori-
ented secured creditor may find comfort in the game founded upon the
philosophy of change of Heraclitus.
"We step and we do not step into the same river; we are and we
are not."124
"You cannot step twice into the same river."25
"All things flow; nothing abides." 26
These epigrams forecast an answer to the arguments asserted in Atoms
and Molecules. Again, the players in this game are concerned princi-
pally with the timing of the transfer.
In the Portland case, the interest of Rose City is regarded as having
been transferred at the time of perfection of the interest in the initial
batch of accounts receivable, because the collateral consists of the ac-
counts as an aggregate or an entity.27 Changes in the constituents of
23 The horse has been used before as an analogy. See 1 CooGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra
note 15, § 13.07[3][c]. The pig simply seems more appropriate.
24 Fragment 81, 2 ENCYCLOPEDiA OF PHiLOSOPHY 75 (Macmillan Co. & Free Press 1967).
25 Fragment 41, id. at 76-
26 Id.
27 The pre-Code analogue is found in Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827
1968]
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the entity are not significant, because the entity itself does not change.
The secured creditor's interest is in the stream of accounts flowing
through the debtor's business, not in any specific accounts. 28 As with
the Heraclitean river, although the accounts in the stream constantly
change, we can say it is the same stream.
Viewing accounts receivable or inventory financing by focusing on
the totality of the collateral rather than on each individual item is
plausible, but certainly not necessary. Both the businessman debtor
and the professional lender probably view the collateral in this way.29
Surely neither would be concerned if a few accounts ripen into old age
without being paid. The careful lender will have taken sufficient prop-
erty so that the ratio of debt to collateral protects him even though
some accounts are uncollectible. Of course, a multitude of old accounts
in the collateral may suggest that the river is polluted.
Yet, the question remains: is the aggregate idea of collateral
adopted by the Uniform Commercial Code? The major obstacle to an
affirmative answer is the Code's demand that the debtor must have
"rights in the collateral" before the security interest can attach and be
perfected. Nonetheless, even this requirement is consistent with the
idea that the "collateral" in which the debtor must have rights is the
river of accounts rather than any specific account. In addition, section
9-108 itself can be viewed as an attempt, albeit awkward and artless, to
adopt the entity theory of accounts and inventory collateral. The sec-
tion fails to express the theory because it uses the legalism that the
transfer is "deemed" to be taken for new value. Conclusively presuming
that something has happened without proof of its occurrence seems,
in a way, to be manufacturing facts.8 0 Only the Bankruptcy Act can
accomplish such miracles.
Whatever conceptual difficulties may be connected with the idea
that inventory and accounts receivable are single entities that "stream"
through the debtor's business, the principal concern should be whether
(Ist Cir. 1951); Colbath v. Mechanicks Nat'l Bank, 96 N.H. 110, 70 A.2d 608 (1950). Judge
Magruder, author of the Manchester Nat'l Bank opinion, took the idea with him to the
West, where it was rejected. Summit Hardware, Inc. v. Foote, 302 F.2d 897 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 882 (1962).
28 See Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Property
Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 194 (1959); Henson, § 9-108 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and § 60a of the Bankruptcy Act Reconciled, 21 Bus. LtWYER 871 (1966);
Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 CoLu, L. RE v. 232 (1965);
Henson, The Portland Case, I GA. L. lRzv. 257 (1967).
29 Williston, Transfers of After-Acquired Personal Property, 19 HAv. L. REV. 557,
581 (1906).
30 Riemer, Bankruptcy-Preference-Conflict Between Section 9-108 of Uniform Com-
mercial Code ,and Section 60(a) of Bankruptcy Act, 70 CoM. L.J. 63, 66 (1965).
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this conception of the collateral contradicts or interferes with some
major policy of the Bankruptcy Act. Is there a significait possibility
that the entity theory would be abused if adopted? The theory is too
blunt a tool for properly balancing the interests of secured and unse-
cured creditors, since it may approve the kind of conduct that the pref-
erence law historically condemns, i.e., the conscious and deliberate
transfer of property to a favored creditor within four months of bank-
ruptcy. How does the theory protect the creditor against the debtor
who liquidates other assets to acquire inventory, which feeds the after-
acquired property clause of the security agreement and thereby favors
an inadequately secured creditor? One might respond that such trickery
by the debtor is less likely in accounts financing, because he would have
to sell the inventory in order to swell the accounts and would have diffi-
culty finding sufficient customers to cooperate in the schemes of an
insolvent. On the other hand, crash or distress sales of inventory might
be used to create accounts to feed the after-acquired clause, and a suffi-
ciently low price might well generate customers who would unwittingly
aid the debtor in preferring the secured creditor.
Thus, the Rivers and Streams game proves too much. There is no
limitation on the ability of the debtor to steer his assets into a form
that will feed the mortgage. If there is only a trickle of collateral prior
to the four month zone, the debtor has complete power to cause a flood
within the period. This result runs afoul of the classic notion of a pref-
erence, i.e., a debtor picking out one creditor to be paid on the eve of
bankruptcy. The law of fraudulent conveyances may provide a solu-
tion to this objection, but it is difficult if not impossible to fit a pure
preference into the badges of fraud of Twyne's Case3' or its modern
progeny, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act8 2
V
TIT FOR TAT
Technically, the. best response to the atomizers is that, even if their
theory times the transfer correctly, a careful secured creditor can ensure
that his security interests in the various accounts are in exchange for
current, rather than antecedent, consideration.m The parties can ar-
31 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
82 For an illuminating and sensitive discussion of how little more must be added to the
facts of preference to establish a fraudulent conveyance, see Judge Dooling's opinion in
Leventhal v. Spillman, 234 F. Supp. 207 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd mer., 362 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1966).
33 2 G. GrMonr, supra note 6, § 45.6, at 1315.
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range that the newly arising accounts be taken in exchange for the
release of rights in earlier accounts. The transfer is taken for the con-
current release of the collateral rather than for the earlier advances,
and thus is for a present consideration. Unlike the other games, Tit
for Tat concentrates upon whether the transfer is for an antecedent
debt.
In Walker v. Clinton State Bank,34 the substitution-of-collateral
argument can be seen at work. A dealer in baby chicks periodically
sold them to growers, who would execute notes for the price secured by
a chattel mortgage on the chicks. The dealer then delivered the
"chicken notes" to a bank for a line of credit at the rate of fifty percent
of the face value of the notes. When a batch of chicks was ready for
market, the grower settled with the dealer, who then obtained the note
and mortgage from the bank in exchange for the "chicken note" of
another grower. Since in this case there is something tangible to handle
and to deliver physically to the bank in exchange for another tangible
piece of paper, it is easier to see substitution at work. It is plain to all
that the relative positions of the bank and the dealer are unaltered by
the exchanges, and that the dealer's other creditors are not harmed by
the transactions with the bank.
When the collateral is the highly intangible ordinary account re-
ceivable, the substitution is less obvious. When all collections from the
accounts are routed into a bank account in control of the secured cred-
itor, and funds are released contemporaneously with a designation of
new accounts to the security arrangement, the substitution of new ac-
counts for a new advance or the release of the proceeds collected on
the old accounts is more visible and plausible. Prior to the reformation
wrought by the Code, this kind of substitution argument could readily
be made by the professional lender. He would have taken these same
steps to avoid the stigma of Benedict v. Ratner,35 which required the
secured creditor to police the collateral or risk losing his secured posi-
tion entirely.36 The Code, however, repealed Benedict v. Ratner, and,
because the doctrine was clearly a matter of state law, there is no
foundation for its survival in bankruptcy.37
Arguably, section 9-108 only attempts to accomplish what is al-
ready done in this substitution theory. Yet, that conclusion states too
much from two viewpoints. First, the substitution doctrine may be a
84 216 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1954).
35 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
36 Greenberg, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 601,
628-29.
37 In re New Haven Clock & Watch Co., 253 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958).
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creature of federal law, not state law. Thus, section 9-108 may be an
attempt to bend bankruptcy results by state legislation in an area where
Congress has not left room for the operation of state law even inter-
stitially38 Second, the boundaries for operation of the substitution doc-
trine are not mapped out. If the "tit for tat" game is to be played under
rules requiring exact, simultaneous exchange of accounts of equivalent
value, then the theoretically attractive idea of substitution is practically
worthless to a secured creditor operating without the policing tech-
niques of the pre-Code Benedict v. Ratner era.8 9
If strict tracing is required, the secured creditor will receive a
preference by any transfer of an account within the four month period
unless the account is substituted specifically for another account or
given to secure a contemporaneous advance. To assure a favorable
fact-finding, the lender will be forced to revive the expensive and time-
consuming procedures rejected as unimportant and cumbersome by
repeal of the state law foundation of Benedict v. Ratner. The unse-
cured creditors as a class will receive no positive benefits from this res-
toration of policing techniques. All significant accounts receivable
transactions must be displayed in a public filing.40 Making secured
business credit more difficult to extend often means that the debtor
will not have sufficient operating funds to pay his unsecured creditors
in the usual course.
One substitute for a strict tracing requirement has the virtue of
demanding relatively simple administrative supervision during the
life of the loan.41 The value of the collateral immediately prior to the
four month period is compared to the value of the accounts at the date
of filing of the petition in bankruptcy. If there has been no net increase
in the amount of the collateral, the incoming accounts are considered
taken in substitution for the collected accounts. On the other hand, if
at the date of bankruptcy the collateral has swollen beyond its value at
the beginning of the four month period, the transfer of the excess will
be classed as a transfer for an antecedent debt, and a preference may be
38 In re Pusey-Maynes-Breish Co., 87 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 122 F.2d 606 (3d
Cir. 1941). Section 60a(8) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(8) (1964), explicitly
treats security transfers for future loans and future advances as transfers for new and
contemporaneous consideration. It is of doubtful help in assaying legislative intent with
respect to federal occupation of the field on the question of defining antecedent debt.
An argument on either side can be built on this provision.
89 This argument is forcefully and thoughtfully developed by Judge Solomon. In re
Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D. Ore. 1967).
40 UCC §§ 9-104(f), 9-302(l)(e).
41 Judge Solomon suggested this approach. In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co.,
271 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D. Ore. 1967).
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found. Under this scheme the secured creditor who continually insists
on a relatively safe ratio of debt to collateral will not lose his accounts
to the trustee's claim of a preference. For example, if the debt-to-col-
lateral ratio is maintained at three-to-four, a $75,000 loan will be se-
cured by a security interest in $100,000 worth of accounts. If the value
of the accounts during the four month period remains above $75,000,
the secured party will still be able to collect his debt from the collateral
in an ordinary bankruptcy. 42 But if the collateral is worth only $50,000
at the outset of the four month period, the secured creditor will be
limited to that amount even if the accounts are worth $100,000 at bank-
ruptcy. In this case the increase would be considered preferential. On
the surface this scheme is easy to administer both for the loan officer
and the bankruptcy court. The secured creditors need only make sure
that the collateral stays ahead of the loan, and the bankruptcy courts
must only decide two fact questions: the value of the collateral at the
beginning and at the end of the four month period.43
Although this "two point" method of tracing makes for easier ad-
ministration than either precise tracing or revival of the policing tech-
niques of Benedict v. Ratner, it has a discriminatory premise. Only
businesses that have a regular and constant flow of accounts or inven-
tory can safely be financed within its boundaries. If the debtor has
fluctuating income, his credit needs will be poorly served. Farmers may
thus have an added obstacle to overcome in obtaining credit, because
their accounts are earned en masse at the end of the growing season.
Other seasonal industries, such as toy manufacturers, suppliers of rec-
reational items, and fashion clothiers, may face this same problem. In
addition, expanding businesses in need of capital will find the prefer-
ence hurdle in their path. Each of these cases involves a situation in
which, without any scheme to harm creditors, the value of the accounts
may increase during the four months prior to bankruptcy. And in each
case, the secured creditor may have planned on the rising accounts as
collateral without violating any standard of business morality. If we
adopt the "two point" method of tracing as a flat rule, we may reach a
workable compromise between the claims of the secured creditor group
and the bankruptcy bar. But, without any other reason, we will be
42 Reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act may present a special peril
to the accounts financer if the trustee needs cash and there is a reasonable likelihood
of a successful reorganization. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Kaplan, 185 F.2d 791 (1st Cir.
1950); In re Newal, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 430 (D. Mass. 1965).
43 See Comment, After-Acquired Property Security Interests in Bankruptcy: A Substi-
tution of Collateral Defense of the U.C.C., 77 YAix L.J. 139 (1967), for an interesting
elaboration of this justification of § 9-108.
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discriminating against a substantial number of debtors and their secured
creditors. Furthermore, because of its ease of administration, the "two
point" rule may tempt the debtor to act in a commercially improper
way to prefer the secured creditor. If the value of the accounts has been
naturally decreasing, the debtor may conduct a crash sale just before
bankruptcy and thereby swell the accounts back up to a level reached
four months earlier. The "two point" rule of substitution will force
the result that no preference has occurred, even though the debtor has
worked the classic preference. A comparable scheme can be worked in
inventory financing if the debtor zealously purchases goods on an open
account basis during the four month period.44
VI
PREFERENCE POLICY AND SECTION 9-108
In finding the transfer to Rose City preferential, the referee con-
ceded that "[t]he wide divergence of opinion gives one pause as to the
correct solution."4 5 No one can quarrel with that remark. It acknowl-
edges that skillful lawyers have fashioned arguments to support each
side of the case-arguments technically splendid and admirably mar-
shalled. Yet, within each of the legal webs spun by the disputants is a
hidden axiom: that Rose City's claim is or is not the kind of interest
that should be avoided by the preference weapon. If clever lawyers
can weave legal arguments for either result, should they not also con-
front the question whether rejection of Rose City's claim serves the pur-
poses of the complex rules of Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act? Should
they not attempt to assay why we have a law of preferences?
The historical development of the law of preferences is nearly as
complex as the present statute. With just a little digging, one finds Lord
Mansfield at the bottom of the development of the preference idea.
A general question has been started, "whether in any case,
upon the eve of a bankruptcy, a man may do that which in conse-
quence prefers a particular creditor:" and that has been argued as
a general question.
But that will depend upon the act. As, if a bankrupt, in course
44 Other avoiding powers of the trustee do not answer this objection, because a
violation of § 9-108 does not affect the perfection of the security interest, nor does such a
violation constitute proof of a fraudulent conveyance. But see Comment, supra note 43, at
156-57.
45 In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., Civil No. B64-3282 (D. Ore., filed Feb. 9,
1966), 4 CCH INSTALMENT CRErr GumE 98,483, at 89,078 (1966), 3 UCC REP. Smv. 194,
223 (1966).
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of payment pays a creditor; this is a fair advantage, in the course of
trade: or, if a creditor threatens legal diligence, and there is no col-
lusion; or begins to sue a debtor; and he makes an assignment of
part of his goods; it is a fair transaction, and what a man might do
without having any bankruptcy in view... But it never entered
into the mind of any Judge, to say "that a man, in contemplation of
an act of bankruptcy, could sit down and dispose of all of his effects
to the use of different creditors:" for, that would be a fraud upon
the acts of bankruptcy. But if done in a course of trade, and not
fraudulent, it may be supported.4 6
This is a remarkable idea: if the debtor acts in the course of trade and
not fraudulently, he can dispose of his assets to different creditors. But
the emphasis on the debtor's state of mind ultimately led the English
courts into a morass of technical confusion.4 7 We can breathe easily
perhaps when we reflect that, after a brief flirtation, our bankruptcy law
rejected the "state of mind of the debtor" test.48 In our present law
the debtor's balance sheet is determinative, and issues of moral cul-
pability explicitly enter the scene only to serve the pragmatic purpose
of saving a transferee who neither knew nor had reason to know of the
debtor's insolvency. 49
Yet, in our law, or rather in our courts, the idea persisted that the
debtor must be at fault before the transfer can be avoided. In inter-
preting the Act of 1898, the Supreme Court, perhaps rebelling against
the avoidance of innocently made transfers, continued to protect cred-
itors who arranged for their security outside the four month period
but who delayed taking the final steps to complete the deal until some
time within the period.50 The legal mechanics of this revolt involved
the idea that the final step, such as recording within the four month
period, could be related back to the time the security arrangement was
made.51 The notion of an "equitable lien" arising at the original ar-
rangement ideally served the purpose, because it supported the con-
clusion that a property interest had been established in the secured
creditor outside the period.5 2
46 Alderson v. Temple, 4 Burr. 2235, 2241 (1812 ed.) (emphasis in original), to be
distinguished from 1776 ed. which has different printing and from 98 Eng. Rep. 165,
168 (K.B. 1768).
47 J. THOMPSON, THE PRINCIPLES OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 68 (1967).
48 Glenn, The Diversities of the Preferential Transfer: A Study in Bankruptcy History,
15 CORNELL L.Q. 521, 537-38 (1930).
49 A contrary rule "might be widely regarded as an intolerable interference with
legitimate business." J. MAcLAcHLAN, BANKRUPTCy § 267 (1956).
50 Glenn, supra note 48, at 540.
51 The most significant "relation back" cases include Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U.S.
91 (1905), and Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U.S. 516 (1905).
52 The highpoint of the "equitable lien" was Sexton v. Kessler & Co., 225 U.S. 90
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In reaction to the relation back and equitable lien doctrines, the
Chandler Act adopted the specific "lien creditor" test,53 under which
the transfer was deemed to have occurred when it became
so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor and
no creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the prop-
erty so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee .... 54
This killed the equitable lien argument, because ancient learning
established that a bona fide purchaser for value could cut off an equi-
table lien. There were murmurs that the new test was a classic case of
overkill, since various forms of legitimate financing, particularly ac-
counts receivable transactions, were imperiled.55 Soothing interpreta-
tions appeared and quieted any legislative battles.50 But the quiet was
shortlived. As hostilities fell upon the world in the early 1940's, war
also broke out in the courts; and trustees temporarily won a total vic-
tory in Corn Exchange Bank v. Klauder.57 After World War II the
combatants moved to the legislatures, and this time the accounts fi-
nancers prevailed on all fronts. Where state law protected the assign-
ment against subsequent assignees at some time outside the four month
period, the Chandler Act test for timing the transfer was of no concern
to the accounts financer. Hence, states were asked to adopt a notice-
filing, bookmarking, or simple validating statute, making the transfer
effective when made or when the required notoriety was given. The
states complied so completely that by 1950 two commentators reported
that only in Mississippi did the preference problem remain. 8
Fresh from that victory, the secured creditor bar moved on to
Washington to eliminate other concerns. The bona fide purchaser test
threatened to delay the time of actual transfers in inventory financing,
because the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, and the various factor's lien acts carried provisions that pro-
(1912). The debtor delivered securities on the eve of bankruptcy, pursuant to a prior letter
of intention; the delivery was upheld, since the letter created an "equitable lien." Compare
Bankruptcy Act § 60a(6), added by 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(6) (1964). See Glenn,
The "Equitable Pledge," Creditors' Rights, and the Chandler Act, 25 VA. L. Rav. 422 (1939).
53 McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill To Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. CHI.
L. REv. 369 (1937).
54 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1940).
55 Douglas, Assigned Accounts as Affected by Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act and
the Provisions of State Law with Reference Thereto, 19 REP. J. 11 (1944).
56 At least one such opinion was given private circulation early in 1940. See McLaugh-
lin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARV. L. REv. 233, 246 (1946).
57 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
58 Conwill & Ellis, Much Ado About Nothing: The Real Effect of Amended 60(a) on
Accounts Receivable Financing, 64 HARv. L. Rlv. 62, 78 (1950).
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tected the buyer in the ordinary course of business.5 9 In 1950 the Bank-
ruptcy Act was amended to eliminate the bona fide purchaser test in
personal property cases and to substitute the lien creditor standard.60
In order to foreclose revival of the doctrines of relation back and equi-
table liens, the amendments also precluded recognition of equitable
liens "where available means of perfecting legal liens" had not been
employed, and set a twenty-one day limit on state laws allowing rela-
tion back for a delayed recording.6 '
Whatever the difficulties in interpreting the 1950 amendments-
and they are many-Congress clearly was rejecting the policy founda-
tion of the Klauder case that accounts receivable financing was somehow
a dirty business. The Uniform Commercial Code confirmed that de-
cision and added new force to the campaign against secret liens by
requiring public filing for all types of accounts receivable financing. 62
The 1950 amendments of the Bankruptcy Act were assailed by
those who saw section 60 as exclusively devoted to the egalitarian
creed that the preference provisions should be used to promote
equality of treatment among all creditors. 63 It seems plain that the
egalitarian view was rejected in the preference amendments. Inventory
and accounts financing received federal legislative protection, when
they could have been left subject to the preference attack under the
prior bona-fide-purchaser test.64
59 Additional areas of concern included (1) fear that § 60 would be read to defeat
all security interests in states where recording is required before the security interest is
good against any creditor or bona fide purchaser, since even unavoidable delay in
recording would result in delay in the transfer to make it for an antecedent debt, and (2)
concern that some creditors with a statutory priority might always defeat security interests,
and thus the security would always be subject to attack as a preference. Countryman, The
Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy
Act, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 76, 83 (1951).
60 64 Stat. 24 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
61 Bankruptcy Act §§ 60a(6)- (7), 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(6)-(7) (1964). I con-
sidered adding another game called "Labels," in which the trustee asserts that the Code
security interest on after-acquired property creates a prohibited "equitable lien." 1 Coo-
GAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 15, § 11.07[5]. This seems too sterile an argument to help
or bother anyone. The evil of the equitable lien in bankruptcy was its secrecy, and the
Code completely avoids that evil. Professor Gilmore quite completely demolishes the label.
2 G. GILMoRE, supra note 6, § 45.7, at 1321-22.
62 In adopting the filing requirement, the Code settled at the state level a debate
on federal filing that had nearly scuttled the 1950 amendment to § 60a. MacLachlan,
Preference Redefined, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1390, 1395 (1950). Compare Hanna, Some Unsolved
Problems Under Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 COLUm. L. Rav. 58, 69-70 (1943).
63 The opponents of reform to diminish the effect of § 60a were vigorous. Oglebay,
Proposed Revision of Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act: A Step Backward, 51 Com. L.J.
263 (1946). Moore & Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvements or Retro-
gression? 57 YALE L.J. 683 (1948).
64 At least these ordinary commercial practices were not left subject to the peril of a
preference claim. The House report on the amendments commented:
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The depth of the bankruptcy bar's concern for the general cred-
itor is difficult to measure, since the Code demands public notice of the
secured creditor's position in nearly all cases. Secrecy of the lien is
simply not a real risk to the general creditor class. Also, under section
9-108, certain conditions protecting the general creditor must be met
before the transfer of the after-acquired property is considered to be
for new value. Section 9-108 marches in the same direction as section
60a to the extent that both statutes are designed to promote commer-
cial morality. We can reject section 9-108 entirely only by completely
adopting the egalitarian notion that the bankruptcy preference should
deprive secured creditors of any position obtained in the four month
period. The problem seems to demand a more subtle answer. Com-
mercial financing is too important to our economic life to subject the
lender to the perils of preference for such artificial reasons as presented
by the Atoms and Molecules game.6 5 The conclusion is buttressed
when one notes that merely more paper work would often cure the
defect.
Section 9-108, after all, is hedged in considerably. First, the se-
curity cannot be taken as an afterthought. Whenever a debtor enters
a security agreement to secure an old debt with after-acquired col-
lateral, the security interest, when it arises, is not protected as being
for new value.66 The secured creditor must make an advance, incur an
obligation, release a perfected security interest, or otherwise give new
value. To the extent that the secured party does not give new value,
the section implies that subsequent acquisitions are transfers for an
antecedent debt.
In addition, the section also requires an examination of the method
The resultant confusion has cast grave doubt upon the validity of normal
business security, in all of the areas covered by trust receipts, factors liens, oil
leases, cattle loans, airplane-equipment financing, chattel mortgages, assignments
of accounts receivable, conditional sales agreements for resale, etc. Indeed, a bank
officer, who appeared as one of the witnesses at the subcommittee hearing, testified
that the situation had come to such a pass that his institution was compelled to
regard all such types of transaction as unsecured loans, and to rule on them, as
to the terms which his bank was willing to enter into them, accordingly.
H.R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1949). See Keefe, Practicing Lawyer's Guide to
the Current Law Magazines, 51 A.B.A.J. 689, 693 (1965).
65 From 1946 to 1966 both non-notification financing and old line factoring grew
from a total $4.3 billion to nearly $25 billion. National Commercial Finance Con-
ference, Inc., Annual Volume of Financing and Factoring of Commercial ReceivAbles
1940-65 (unpublished; on file in the Cornell Law Library). If comparable figures were
available from the banks, the growth rate would probably be even greater, because banks
came to the field late.
66 This point raises doubts about the use of § 9-108 to validate the security interest
in cash proceeds in the hands of the debtor during the four month period, when the
security agreement originally secured old debt as well as future advances. See In re White,
- F. Supp. - (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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by which the debtor acquired rights in the collateral. Echoing Lord
Mansfield, the primary test protects only transactions in which the
debtor acquired rights in the collateral in the ordinary course of his
business.6 Thus, manipulative conduct, such as a crash sale, that in-
ordinately "feeds" the security interest is not protected. In this light,
the Code does more for the general creditor than treat the collateral
as a river or stream or adopt the "two point" tracing rule of Tit
for Tat. Unusual fluctuations in the four month period will be sub-
ject to the scrutiny of the bankruptcy court in a more realistic fashion
than under any of the games outlined previously. We may be uncom-
fortable with an approach that leaves so many fact questions, but the
method can be an effective weapon to prevent overreaching by the se-
cured creditor as well as zealous generosity by the debtor.
The rule can have a far-reaching effect outside of bankruptcy.
Until a bankruptcy petition is filed, no one knows when the four month
preference period commences. Thus, any security interest in collateral
acquired by a debtor outside the ordinary course of his business must
be suspect at the outset, simply because bankruptcy may follow within
four months. This factor will encourage business morality. On the other
hand, treating all after-acquired interests that arise within four months
of bankruptcy as preferences would only serve to thwart a desirable
method of financing.
If section 9-108 is allowed to stand as the test for determining
whether a transfer is supported by an antecedent debt, some guidelines
must be evolved for the "ordinary course" test. We might immediately
think of the cases decided under the bulk transfer laws, which require
a notice to protected creditors whenever the debtor makes a bulk
transfer not in the ordinary course of his business. Since the antecedent
debt rule and the bulk transfer rule use the same terminology, em-
ploying the terms interchangeably in each section is naturally attrac-
tive.68 Yet, even though both provisions may aim at the protection of
general creditors, we are dealing with two different kinds of protection.
A court might properly define "ordinary course of business" broadly
67 As an alternative to the ordinary course requirement, § 9-108 offers protection to
the secured creditor if the debtor's rights were acquired "under a contract of purchase
made pursuant to the security agreement within a reasonable time after new value is
given." This alternative should not be troublesome, since it is consistent with the grace
period for filing in the Bankruptcy Act § 60a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(7). It is also consistent
with the protections generally extended to purchase-money financing. See Hogan, Financing
the Acquisition of New Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. Rxv. 115, 120 n.18, 154-55 (1962), reprinted in 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 15,
§ 19.02 [1][a], at 1968 n.18, and § 19.06, at 2008-11.
68 UCC § 6-102(1).
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for bulk sales purposes in order to avoid the harsh consequence of
failure to comply with the notice requirements.6 9 On the other hand,
section 9-108 does not involve the problem of making a prospective
decision about what constitutes compliance with the statute. The de-
cision is mainly retroactive in that the past conduct of a debtor is being
characterized; fixed guidelines for future cases are not being set. It is
no more necessary to follow the bulk transfer cases than to adopt the
standard of buying in ordinary course in the buyer-protection sections
of Articles 2, 7, or 9.70 We are dealing with a different problem, involv-
ing different interests, and we should seek an answer in light of our
specific question.
If the section 9-108 ordinary-course-of-business test is permitted to
control, the examination of the higher metaphysics of transfer will be
exchanged for an intensive factual exploration of the method, manner,
and terms of the debtor's acquisition of rights in the collateral. Of
course, this offers an invitation to preference litigation in every bank-
ruptcy involving inventory and accounts financing. There is little doubt
that the invitation will be accepted. The thought of adding to the
burgeoning expenses of bankruptcy administration should make even a
law professor pause. 71 Is there a way to narrow the opportunity for
endless factual disputes, while preserving the possibility of taking a
hard look at the malodorous transaction?72
Borrowing from the Tit for Tat game, but without risking ap-
proval of the deliberate preference, we can give the secured creditor
the benefit of a rebuttable presumption. If there is no net increase in
the value of the collateral between the day prior to the four month
period and the date of bankruptcy, then the debtor's acquisition of
rights will be presumed to be in the ordinary course of business.73 Con-
60 Sternberg v. Rubenstein, 305 N.Y. 235, 112 N.E.2d 210 (1953).
70 UCC §§ 2-403, 7-504, 9-807.
71 Of the 186,219 ordinary bankruptcy cases dosed in fiscal year 1966, only 18,532
were classified as "asset" cases, in which there was some distribution to creditors over and
above exemptions and costs of administration. Nationally, expenses of administration
absorbed 24.8% of these assets. There were 20,260 "nominal asset" cases in which the
assets were consumed in payment of the costs of administration. Of the remaining cases,
116,407 were simply "no asset" cases. ADMINISrRATIVE OFFICE oF THE UNITED STATES CoURTS,
TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS for period ending June 30, 1966, at 7-11.
72 Norris Darrell might have been referring to this kind of problem when he reportedly
stated: "the technicians will say something is all right when viscerally it smells bad."
M. MAYER, TiE IAwYmES 343 (1967).
73 It is relatively easy for the lawyer examining these transactions to mistake the
book value of the accounts for their true value. As the borrower comes closer to insolvency,
the true value of his accounts receivable may become less than their value on his books.
In his anxiety to increase his cash flow, the worried debtor may be more ready to ship
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versely, if there is a net increase in the value of the collateral between
the two crucial dates, the secured creditor will be required to show that
the acquisitions were in the ordinary course of the debtor's business.
Perhaps a specific example will help to clarify the notion. In Port-
land Newspaper the trustee raises the preference issue by showing that
some accounts arose within the four month period and secured the loan
made outside the period. Rose City then seeks the protection of section
9-108 by showing (1) that some "new value" was given at the outset of
the secured relationship, and (2) that (in non-purchase-money situa-
tions) 74 the debtor's rights in the accounts arising within the four month
period were obtained in the ordinary course of the debtor's business.
The second of these requirements can be met by using the sug-
gested presumption. If the lender shows that there was no net increase
in the value of the collateral between the day prior to the four month
zone and the date of bankruptcy, the debtor's acquisition of rights in
the accounts during the four month period is presumed to be in the
ordinary course. Nevertheless, the trustee can still come forward with
evidence that the value fluctuated drastically during the four month
period and that the changes were unusual when compared to compar-
able periods in the debtor's business life. At this point the secured
creditor might respond with proof that explains the fluctuations, e.g.,
seasonal activity, expansion of the business, end-of-year sales.
Similarly, unless the secured creditor is able to show initially that
the value of the collateral was not greater on the latter of the two sig-
nificant dates, he will be forced into a factual battle concerning the
"ordinary course" of the debtor's acquisitions. When the case is de-
cided on such a factual basis, there are two guidelines for the fact-
finder. First, section 9-108 specifically calls for a determination in light
of the debtor's course of business, not some standard course of business
formulated in terms of the "reasonable man." Of course, the deter-
mination whether a transfer is within the protected class cannot be
turned over to the debtor entirely. Encouraging the deliberate pref-
erence should be avoided. To this extent an objective test must be
interposed. Is there any business reason to explain the increase in value
defective or substandard merchandise, to ignore the credit ratings of his buyers, or to
ship to poor credit risks. Furthermore, the obligors on the accounts may lose interest
in paying the obligation when bankruptcy intervenes, because there is no longer a con-
tinuing relation with a supplier. All these factors combine to make the appraisal of
the accounts most difficult. The difficulty is enhanced by the fact that the firm lending on
an accounts receivable basis is in a sense fundamentally the expert in appraising the
value, since such determinations are a regular part of its buginess.
74 See note 67 supra.
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of the collateral? Is that reason independent of the fact that the debt6r's
acquisition of rights will enhance the position of the lender?
A second guideline for the fact-finder may be found in, the general
obligation of good faith that runs throughout the Code. Section 1-203
incorporates the duty of subjective honesty in fact into every contract
or obligation under the Act. If the trustee presents evidence showing
that the debtor-bankrupt specifically intended to prefer the secured
creditor at the time rights in the collateral were acquired, that evidence
itself might tend to show that the transaction was not in the ordinary
course of the debtor's business. In addition, evidence of a purposive
preference may show a lack of subjective good faith. This second guide-
line is not particularly appropriate, however, because section 9-108 does
not involve a contractual or statutory duty of the debtor and because
the lack of good faith relates to a Bankruptcy duty, not to a Code
obligation. Despite these technical distinctions, the good faith test may
by analogy supply help in defining "ordinary course."
The presumption of an "ordinary course" acquisition is particu-
larly helpful because it protects an arrangement made well outside of
the four month zone. That some of the collaterial is acquired within the
four month period does not adequately support an attack on a non-
fraudulent and filed secured transaction entered into a year before
bankruptcy. On the other hand, the presumption will not safeguard
in any way the secured creditor who enters into an arrangement with
the debtor entirely within the four month period. Such a creditor will
be forced to establish that the acquisition of the debtor's rights was in
the ordinary course of his business. The same demand will be placed
on the secured creditor who claims as after-acquired property collateral
acquired in the four month period when he had no collateral.
CONCLUSION
Even a fleeting glance at the recent history of the law of prefer-
ences raises doubts about the effectiveness of statutory repairs to the
preference rules of the Bankruptcy Act as the means of recognizing
commercially accepted forms of financing. The acceptance of the Uni-
form Commercial Code by forty-nine states and by Congress for the
District of Columbia strongly suggests that section 9-108 does not li-
cense conduct that the country regards as immoral or commercially un-
acceptable. On the contrary, even in those states where the Code was
scrupulously scrutinized, section 9-108 was left untouched.75 A sensitive
75 Only Alaska modified § 9-108, and then only to alter its language rather than its
substance. 1 CCH INSTALMENT CRDmT GumE 708 (1967).
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and sensible recognition of the Code rule will permit us to concentrate
on the facts of the particular problem and to leave behind the fun-
filled, but unreal games we have been playing with inventory and
accounts receivable financing.
